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Abstract. This article investigates the relationship between political knowledge 
and trust in the EU among the Romanian citizens between 2002 and 2009. It uses 
individual level data from the Candidate Countries (2001-2004) and Standard 
Eurobarometers (2005-2009) to check whether there is a direct linkage between the 
decreasing level of trust and the increasing level of knowledge in the most Euro-
optimist new member state. The statistical analysis reveals that the more citizens 
know about the EU, the more they trust it. Such a result gains supplementary 
relevance in the context of decreasing support. Two other general results are relevant 
for the Romanian case. First, although the level of political knowledge increases as 
the accession gets closer, it continues to be quite low. Second, the Romanian citizens 
constantly overestimate their knowledge about the EU.
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Introduction
For approximately one decade, the 
Romanian citizens display the highest level 
of support for the European Union (EU) 
among the member states (Eurobarometers 
2001-2009). Such an observation is not 
surprising as evidence indicates that until 
their accession, the citizens from candidate 
countries display higher levels of support 
than those coming from the old member 
states (Jacobs and Pollack, 2006). In this 
group, Romania is the absolute leader with 
impressive levels of support peaking almost 
80% (Gherghina 2010). Another particularity 
of this most recent joiner is that its citizens 
have low and very low levels of political 
information about the EU (Gherghina 
and Jiglău 2008; Gherghina 2010). This 
article aims to investigate the relationship 
between these two characteristics. In doing 
so, I combine exploratory and inferential 
analysis, using descriptive and bivariate 
statistical methods at individual level. 
The study uses data from the Candidate 
Countries Eurobarometers (CCEBs 2001-
2004) and Standard Eurobarometers (EBs 
2005-2009), examining the 2001-2009 
period. In descriptive terms, I summarize 
the longitudinal evolutions of four different 
aspects, two emphasizing the EU trust and 
and two knowledge related. On the one 
hand, I account for the trust Romanians 
vest in the EU and the image they project 
for themselves about the EU. On the 
other hand, I consider both objective and 
perceived levels of knowledge about the 
EU, comparing their trends over time. Such 
comparisons are done having the 2007 
accession as a reference point to check 
whether this moment modified the trust and/
or knowledge trends. 
This analysis is embedded within the 
broader theoretical framework of types of 
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support and motivations leading to popular 
support for the EU, mostly conducted in 
the old member states (Gabel and Palmer 
1995; Gabel 1998; Hix 1999). In theory, 
Easton (1965) differentiates between types of 
support and labels them as diffuse (general) 
and specific (particular). Empirically, starting 
from this general typology, Kopecký and 
Mudde (2002) build two dimensions 
of support (for the EU and for European 
integration) and identify four different types 
of support: EU optimists, EU pessimists, 
Europhiles, Europhobes. Their research 
indicates that, in practice, the support for the 
EU is multi-layered, involving elites, political 
parties, and citizens. At elite and party level, 
there was a widespread consensus about 
the necessity of the EU accession, the entire 
2004 electoral campaign transforming this 
into a salient issue on the agenda. Regarding 
the determinants of the EU support at 
citizens’ level, there were a few competing 
explanations. The most prominent lies in 
the perception of economic benefits from 
membership (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; 
Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and 
Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998). A second 
explanation emphasizes the direct linkage 
between trust in the national institutions 
and the EU with citizens satisfied with the 
performance of the former being also more 
confident in the latter (Sanchez-Cuenca, 
2000; Rohrschneider 2002). A third cause 
for support consists of a wide range of 
ideological orientations and attitudes 
towards the domestic political issues 
(Anderson 1998). 
Starting from these premises, this article 
moves beyond the causes of high levels of 
support by exploring the dynamic of trust 
in the EU, the image built by the Romanian 
citizens, and their knowledge about the EU 
for almost one decade. Complementary, I 
study the relationship between support and 
knowledge in the most likely case among the 
member states: citizens are Euro-optimists 
and know relatively little about the EU. 
The first section sketches three theoretical 
arguments for which we would expect such 
a relationship to exist, revealing its equivocal 
nature. The second section briefly explains 
the variable operationalization and data 
sources, followed by an extended section 
including the general attitudinal trends 
registered in the last decade in Romania. 
The fourth section explores the relationship 
between trust in the EU and political 
knowledge regarding the European issues, 
whereas the conclusions summarize the 
main findings and provide room for further 
research.
Why Should Knowledge Matter?
Irrespective of the motivations and 
incentives to support the EU, such attitudes 
require, in theory, a minimal cognitive basis. 
It is hard to support an institution without 
knowing what it stands for. Following this 
logic, knowledge precedes support. There 
are two competing perspectives reflecting on 
the role of knowledge in developing attitudes 
of trust towards the EU. The first assumes that 
the more knowledge citizens acquire about 
the EU functioning, the more question marks 
can be raised. There are several aspects that 
may develop into negative perceptions of the 
EU as soon as people learn about them: the 
democratic deficit (Karp et al. 2003), the lack 
of transparency in the EU decision processes 
(Lodge 1994), the weak European political 
parties, the failure to adopt an EU constitution 
or to ratify treaties in the first attempt (e.g. 
The Lisbon Treaty), the difficult decision-
making and implementation mechanisms. 
At empirical level, in the particular context 
of awareness about the European Parliament 
(EP), the level of knowledge is negatively 
correlated with support for the EP in the EU 
member states (Flickinger et al. 1995). 
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The second perspective implies cognitive 
mobilization. High levels of political 
awareness and developed skills in political 
communication allow individuals to identify 
themselves as citizens of a supranational 
political community (Inglehart et al. 1991). 
As the information about the EU is usually 
quite abstract, cognitive skills are necessary 
to process and understand this information. 
Irrespective of the content of the message, 
information about integration promotes 
support. As citizens know more about 
the EU, they become more familiar with 
the subject and feel less threatened by it 
(Inglehart et al. 1991, 147; Janssen 1991). 
In this respect, empirical evidence suggests 
that people interested in the EU politics 
favor their country’s involvement in the 
EU (Anderson 1998). Moreover, greater 
knowledge about the EU maximizes the 
awareness of membership benefits and thus 
may end in a positive evaluation of the EU. 
Although leading to different results and 
driven by opposed underlying mechanisms, 
both situations reflect how knowledge 
represents a precondition for attitudes 
formation. The knowledge of the EU can 
bring with it both a greater appreciation 
of, and frustration with, the EU – either 
response is possible. However, in certain 
circumstances attitude formation and lack 
of knowledge about the attitudes’ object 
can co-exist. For example, if an issue is not 
salient for most citizens, the latter can use 
shortcuts for attitude formation. In the case 
of the EU support, knowledge about the EU 
becomes redundant when the elite reach a 
consensus and citizens follow the discourse 
of their representatives. As soon as the elites’ 
supportive discourse towards accession 
is adopted by individuals in society, their 
positive attitudes have little or no cognitive 
bases. 
Without arguing in favor of any 
approach, I explore which situation applies 
to the Romanian citizens when expressing 
their supportive attitudes towards the EU. In 
this respect, I investigate whether the support 
for the EU is low among the knowledgeable 
citizens. Moreover, in longitudinal 
perspective, it is relevant to observe whether 
the support decreases at individual level as 
soon as people start learning more about 
the EU. The latter is a process expected to 
develop with higher intensity just before and 
during the post-accession period. 
Data and Variable Operationalization
I use candidate countries and standard 
Eurobarometer survey data from 2002 to 
2009 (one per year). These surveys are 
appropriate to map trends as they include 
large comparable datasets in terms of 
standardized questionnaires, sampling 
method, and data collection. For this 
study, all the “do not know/do not answer” 
responses were eliminated from the sample, 
being considered missing values. Trust in 
the EU is operationalized as the answer of 
the Romanian respondents to the questions 
directly involving this issue: “How much 
trust do you have in the EU?”. There are 
two response alternatives: “tend to trust” 
and “tend not to trust”. The image of the 
EU is operationalized as the answer of the 
Romanian respondents to the question: 
”In general does the EU conjure up for 
you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, 
fairly negative, very negative image?” The 
initial answers were coded on a 1-5 scale 
with neutral as medium value. I recoded 
this variable to have only three categories 
by combining the very positive and fairly 
positive answers into the ”positive” category 
and the fairly negative and very negative 
answers into the ”negative” category. 
 The political knowledge is an index for 
which I computed three items. As the battery 
of questions changes across time, I tried 
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to include similar sets of questions as they 
tested the level of knowledge on specific 
issues They are all ”true/false” items and are 
equally weighted when forming the index. 
The first variable refers to the number of 
member states, the respondent being asked 
to mention whether the number of member 
states specified in the question is the real one. 
For the 2002-2003 CCEBs the respondents 
were asked to mention whether the Union 
consists of 15 member states and I coded all 
the ”true” answers as being knowledgeable, 
whereas the rest as holding no knowledge 
(including here the ”do not know”). Starting 
with the 2004 CCEB and continuing with 
the 2005-2008 Ebs, the question referred 
to 12 member states when the EU was 15 
and to fifteen when the EU was 25 or 27. 
Therefore, the ”false” answer is coded as 
knowledgeable answer, whereas the rest 
coded as lacking knowledge. The second 
item regards the direct election of the MEPs, 
all respondents who answered ”true” were 
considered knowledgeable. In the 2008 EB, 
this item was replaced by Switzerland being 
a member of the EU, the ”false” answer being 
correct. The third item varied the most: in the 
2002-2004 CCEBs the question referred to 
the EU being founded after World War I (the 
”false” answer indicates knowledge about 
the EU); in the 2005-2009 EBs the item 
referred to the last EP elections (the ”false” 
answer indicates knowledge about the EU). 
For the 2009 EB a very specific question 
was introduced (i.e. the way in which the 
EU budget is spent) and this influenced 
the results as it will become visible in the 
following section. After computing the index, 
the resulting variable has four categories: no 
knowledge (people that answer wrong at 
all three questions), basic knowledge (one 
correct answer), medium knowledge (two 
correct answers), and high (all three answers 
being correct). 
High Trust and Good Image
Graph 1 depicts the dynamics of trust 
(continuous line) and lack of trust (dotted 
line) in the EU among the Romanian citizens 
between 2002 and 2009. Overall, there is 
a relative decrease of the level of trust and 
a slight increase of the lack of trust. Despite 
these trends, the percentage of citizens 
trusting the EU is very high, more than 70% 
of the valid answers indicating every year the 
full support for the EU. The decrease took 
place from levels of approximately 80% 
before the accession to a minimum of 72%in 







2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Trust Do not trust
Graph 1: Percentages of Trust in the EU among the Romanian Citizens
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The peak from 2004 (85% trust in the 
EU) can be justified through the accession 
of many post-communist countries and the 
Romanian failure to join in that wave. The 
good example of the neighboring and their 
successful accession could have shed a 
positive light on the EU in the eyes of the 
Romanian citizens. Moreover, the electoral 
campaign from 2004 touched upon the 
European accession and often emphasized 
the benefits derived from membership. In 
fact, previous studies reveal that the drop 
in trust visible from 2003 in this graph was 
accidental. The Euro-optimism of Romanians 
reached constant levels above 80% before 
2004, even when accounting for two EBs 
in every year (Gherghina 2010).  Between 
2005 and 2007 there was a constant level 
of trust in the EU (77%).  Starting with the 
accession year, there is a slow decrease of 
support for the EU, with a bigger difference 
between 2008 and 2009 than between the 
accession and the following year. 
The perceptions about the image of the 
EU display a similar trend. Graph 2 includes 
the aggregated dynamic of the percentages 
of Romanians having positive (continuous 
line), neutral (continuous line with triangles), 
and negative (dotted line) images about the 
EU. There are two directly observable issues 
at this graph. First, the positive perception 
decreases over time from 83% in 2002 to 
67% in 2009. It is hard to know what this 
perception is based on especially when 
comparing it to the previous graph. There 
are more people trusting the EU than having 
a positive image about it. When closely 
examining the individual level data it results 
that some of those who have neutral image 
about the EU also vest trust into it. The 
second general observation is that the level 
of negative image is relatively constant, at a 
very low level, situated below 10%. Looking 
again at individual data, we observe that 
only in isolated cases (one here and there) 
individuals with a negative image of the EU 
trust it. In none of these situations, the EU 
accession made a significant difference in 
the citizens’ perceptions. There is practically 
no change of trend or major deviation due 
to this event. 
At the same time, the neutral perceptions 
of the EU have a tendency to increase over 
time. There is an evolution from 12 (2002) 
to 26% (in 2009). This category may not 
contain substantive meaning as it can 
include all those subject who have no clear 
opinion on their perception about the EU. In 
other words, this can be seen as a masked/
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Positive Neutral Negative
Graph 2: The Evolution of the EU Image for the Romanian Citizens
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Three conclusions can be drawn on the 
basis of these aggregated data. First, the 
Romanians trust the EU and have a positive 
image about it. Second, their perceptions 
were not influenced by the accession. 
Third, there is a descending trend both with 
respect to the trust in and the image of the 
EU. However, the percentages are quite 
impressive.
Overestimating Political Knowledge
The most basic question targeting the 
political knowledge of the respondents in 
the used survey regards the identification of 
the correct number of member states at the 
moment when the question is being asked. 
Graph 3 displays the evolution of the correct 
– wrong report of the Romanian respondents 
during the 2002-2008 period (2009 is not 
included as there was no question about 
the number of member states). The first 
striking element is the reduced knowledge 
on the number of member states: only 
in 2003 above 50%, reaching in 2004 a 
negative record of 12%. This should be seen 
in the context of a true/false question, the 
subjects were not even asked to mention 
the number of member states. There is 
increased oscillation of the percentages of 
knowledgeable Romanians when answering 
this question: it increases from 2002 until 
2003, it is followed by a sudden drop in 
2004 and until 2008 there is an increase 
of this percentage. In 2009, the percentage 
decreases from 49 to 47%. What causes the 
drop in 2004? One plausible explanation 
resides in the type of addressed question. 
Until 2003, the question included the correct 
number of member states and the subjects 
only had to agree to that (i.e. they were asked 
whether the EU consisted of 15 member 
states). Starting 2004, the respondents had to 
figure out that the question included a wrong 
number of member states and to answer 
“false” in order to show their knowledge 
about the EU. As 2004 was the first year 
when the change took place, the effect of 
switching the question is visible.
The increased percentages of people 
indicating the correct answer about the 
member states from 2005 onwards may be 
due to the 2004 accession of the neighboring 
countries. Although Romania failed to join 
the EU, people may have started paying 
attention to news about it. However, such an 
explanation does not hold if we observe the 
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Correct Wrong
Graph 3: The Knowledge about the Number of Member States
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Romania got into the EU, the knowledge of 
its citizens regarding the number of member 
states should have significantly improved. 
This is not the case, less than 50% of the 
respondents being able to correctly identify 
the number of member states. 
The situation is similar with the other 
components of the political knowledge. 
The question about the foundation of the 
EU after World War I was asked until 2004 
and a maximum of 20% in 2004 identified 
that this statement was wrong. The direct 
elections of the MEPs is a tough question for 
most Romanians until 2007, a maximum of 
37% correctly answered that this is an EU 
procedure. However, the learning by doing 
mechanism functioned with respect to this 
question: in 2009, 66% of the respondents 
correctly answered this question. When 
getting to specific questions such as 
Switzerland being an EU member (asked in 
the 2008 EB), almost half of the respondents 
(48%) got it right. Even more specific, the way 
in which the EU budget is spent was correctly 
identified by only 8% of the population. The 
individual level data indicate that among 
these respondents who correctly identified 
the way of spending the European budget, 
at least half may have guessed the answer as 
they did not successfully answered simpler 
questions. 
Graph 4 displays the evolution of 
the knowledge about the EU among the 
Romanian citizens. A very high percentage 
of respondents have no political knowledge 
about the EU, answering wrong to the 
questions about the number of member 
states, the direct way of electing the MEPs 
and to the third variable question. The 
2004 peak can be justified through the 
same argument as before: a switch in the 
question about the member states leads to 
many errors of the respondents. This cannot 
be considered an excuse for not answering 
right to this question. Following the 2004 
moment, there is a descending pattern for 
the people having no knowledge about the 
EU. In 2009, this percentage is below that of 
those having basic and medium knowledge. 
The percentage of the respondents with 
basic knowledge follows a similar trend, 
but with minor oscillations. A reverse trend 
is visible at the respondents with medium 
knowledge, whose percentage increases 
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Inexistent Basic Medium High
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from 19 in 2002 to 43 in 2009. A possible 
explanation for these patterns lies in the 
quantity and diversity offered to citizens 
as the accession moment got closer. The 
saliency of the EU in media coverage is 
for the Romanian case negatively related 
with the time left until the accession. At 
the same time, not many citizens are 
interested in searching information that is not 
immediately useful. Such a context favors 
the existence of high percentages of people 
with predominantly no or basic information 
in 2002-2004 within the population. The 
decrease of these percentages between 2005 
and 2008 is compensated by the existence 
within the population of more people with 
higher levels of knowledge about the EU (i.e. 
medium). 
The accession moment gains relevance 
when looking at the levels of people with 
high knowledge about the EU. There is a 
constant level until 2006 when, one year 
before the accession, it starts increasing.1 It is 
logical to expect people from a new member 
state developing their levels of knowledge 
about the EU. However, the percentage 
did not reach spectacular peaks, in the year 
of the accession 15% of the respondents 
having high political knowledge. However, 
one year later, almost a quarter of the 
respondents (24%) was able to correctly 
answer the knowledge questions. 
As these are the levels of objective 
knowledge, let us turn now to the difference 
between them and what Romanians 
perceived as knowledge. In other words, 
we investigate how large is the discrepancy 
between what the Romanians know and 
what they thought they know. Graph 5 is 
illustrative in this respect, showing both 
positive and negative values.2 Theoretically, 
when the difference between the levels 
of objective and perceived knowledge is 
above 0, the subjects underestimate their 
knowledge. The evidence indicates that only 
one of the situations can be interpreted as 
such – the case of the 2006 high knowledge 
when the current knowledge is 2% above 
the perceived knowledge. For the rest of 
the cases above 0, we have the difference 
between levels real lack of knowledge and 
perceived lack of knowledge. Practically, 
they underestimate the level of inexistent 
knowledge. Therefore, the logical reciprocal 
indicates that this is an overestimation of 
the knowledge. Whenever this difference is 
negative, they overestimate the knowledge 
they have. Summing up, most of the bars 
in Graph 5 indicate that subjects have the 
tendency to overestimate their knowledge 
about the EU.  
The biggest difference is registered for 
the category with no knowledge about 
the EU. For example, in the 2005 EB, 
45% of the respondents have no political 
knowledge about the EU, compared with 
17% who admitted this fact. The smallest 
overestimation of knowledge with respect to 
this category takes place in 2003 when the 
difference between the actual and perceived 
lack of knowledge is of 10%. For basic and 
medium knowledge the overestimation is 
moderate, but it is visible in every year. One 
final remark about this graph is that, overall, 
the overestimation of the high knowledge 
is very small. For the year 2005 the actual 
and perceived high knowledge about the 
EU are identical, their difference being 0. As 
previously mentioned, in the EB 2006 there 
is an underestimation of the actual high 
knowledge. Summing up, with the exception 
of the high knowledgeable citizens, most of 
the respondents tend to heavily overestimate 
their knowledge about the EU. 
1 As mentioned, the downturn from 2008 is mainly due to the specificity of the questions.
2 The analyzed period is 2002-2006 as the question with perceived knowledge is no longer asked in the EBs.
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A Weak but Stable Relationship
Table 1 includes the association 
coefficients (gamma) between the trust in the 
EU and the levels of knowledge. The trust in 
the EU is a nominal variable (trust and lack of 
trust), whereas the knowledge variable has 
the same four categories as in graphs 4 and 5. 
The coefficients indicate weak to moderate 
positive associations, all but the one from 
2004, being statistically significant at 0.01. 
These results suggest that the support for the 
EU increases with the level of knowledge 
about it. Respondents with no knowledge 
about the EU trust it the least.  The intensity 
of the relationship is stronger in the two 
years before the 2004 missed accession 
wave and in the 2007 accession year. This 
partially confirms the theoretical assumption 
according to which as soon as citizens learn 
more about the EU they feel less threatened 
and have the tendency to trust it more. The 
association between trust and knowledge 
is weak but stable during the last decade 
for the Romanians. It holds even when the 
knowledge questions become specific and 
thorough information is required (i.e. 2009)
As this is solely a bivariate relationship, 
without controlling for the influence of other 
variables, no substantive and definitive 
conclusions can be drawn. However, 
the similarity in intensity and direction of 
the relationship is a safe finding. In this 
respect, it is useful to take a closer look at 
the distribution of the respondents. Table 2 
reflects the distribution of the percentages 
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Graph 5: The Difference between Objective and Perceived Knowledge
Table 1: The Longitudinal Relationship 
between Trust in the EU and Political 
Knowledge









** Statistically significant at 0.01.
* Statistically significant at 0.05.
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general story. The pattern described by the 
association coefficients is clearly illustrated 
by the extreme categories: 67% of those 
having no knowledge about the EU trust it, 
whereas 85% among those who know a lot 
about the EU trust it. There is also progressive 
distribution of percentages of trust among 
the basic and medium category, with 76% 
in the former and 85% in the latter. There is 
apparently no difference of attitudes towards 
the EU between those having medium and 
high knowledge. In the presence of such 
a difference, the association coefficient 
would have increased. By comparing the 
percentages of people lacking trust in the 
EU within the inexistent, medium, and high 
knowledge categories, there are twice as 
many without political knowledge relative 
to those medium and highly knowledgeable.
Conclusions
This article described the dynamics of 
knowledge about and trust in the EU among 
the Romanian citizens between 2002-2009, 
using individual level data from the CCEBs 
and EBs. The level of knowledge about the 
EU is generally modest, with less than half 
of the respondents being able to identify 
the correct number of the member states 
at any given moment in time (except of 
2003 when the percentage was 53%). The 
knowledge improves when the EU becomes 
a salient issue for citizens, largely covered 
by the media, and emphasized by elites and 
political parties on the public agenda. At the 
same time, the time factor cannot be ignored: 
at the beginning of the 2000’s the Romanian 
public was generally less informed, with 
significant improvements of the knowledge 
levels when the accession was missed (2004) 
or realized (2007). Moreover, it is worth 
noting that Romanians overestimate their 
political knowledge about the EU. Most of 
the times, people without such knowledge 
have the tendency to declare that they have 
some. In parallel, the trust in the EU registers 
a descendent trend, with averages around 
80% before the 2004 wave of accession and 
slightly more than 70% in 2009. 
Such patterns of the aggregated data may 
indicate that the more Romanians know about 
the EU, the least they trust it. However, the 
individual level analysis contradicts such an 
expectation and reveals a consistent positive 
relationship between the level of knowledge 
and the trust in the EU. Respondents with 
medium or high knowledge about the EU 
trust it more compared to those with no or 
little knowledge. Although the relationship 
is quite weak, it is statistically significant at 
0.01 (with one exception), indicating a trend 
not only in the analyzed sample, but within 
the entire population. 
There are two direct implications of these 
findings. On the one hand, at empirical level, 
it shows that citizens from one new member 
state can support even more the EU when 
Table 2: The Relationship between Trust in the EU and Political Knowledge  
in the Accession Year
Political knowledge
Inexistent Basic Medium High
Trust in  
the EU
Lack of trust 33% 24% 15% 15%
Trust 67% 76% 85% 85%
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they know more about it. Such evidence 
confirms the results of Karp et al. (2003) 
and necessitates additional clarification in 
the context of decreasing levels of trust in 
the EU within the Romanian population. 
Knowing more about the EU substantiates 
the support for it and diminishes the risk 
to witness dramatic drops. The recent 
turbulences at European level (e.g. the Irish 
referendum, the Czech opposition to the 
Lisbon Treaty), the trust in the EU has high 
chances to decrease of the citizens have 
no political knowledge about the European 
process and developments. On the other 
hand, at theoretical level, this study indicates 
knowledge as a potential explaining variable 
for the level of trust within the member 
states. In this respect, the article sets relevant 
bases for further research. This bivariate 
statistical analysis can be complemented by 
complex models on the Romanian case or it 
can be extended to the new member states 
to observe comparable features within the 
populations. 
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